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Right to Buy… Time to Move? Investigating the Effect of the 
Right to Buy on Moving Behaviour in the UK 
 
One of the goals of the Right to Buy (RTB) was to stimulate labour migration by removing the 
debilitating effect of social housing on geographical mobility. This is the first study to examine 
rigorously whether the Right to Buy legislation did indeed ‘free-up’ those in social housing 
who bought their homes. Using longitudinal data from the British Household Panel Survey 
(BHPS) and panel regression models we show that the probability of a RTB-owner making a 
long distance move falls between that of social renters and owner occupiers. However, the 
difference between RTB-owners and neither homeowners nor social renters is significant. 
Social renters are significantly less likely to move over long distances than traditional owners. 
The results also suggest that RTB-owners are less likely than traditional owners to move for 
job related reasons, but more likely than social renters. 
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The Right to Buy (RTB) legislation was introduced in the 1980 Housing Act by Thatcher’s 
Conservative Government elected in 1979. The legal RTB is one of the most significant 
transformations of the British social housing market. Since it was introduced, over 2.7 million 
public sector dwellings have been sold to sitting tenants at prices well below market value, 
transferring wealth from the state to private households (Jones and Murie, 2006). The 
primary reason for these sales was to stimulate homeownership and to respond to the desire 
of some tenants to own their properties. A second – and less frequently mentioned – objective 
of the RTB policy was to stimulate the economy by encouraging the inter-regional mobility 
of those in the public sector (Boyle, 1997). Tony Durant, MP for the Conservatives said in 
1980 “The exercise of this right will bring about greater mobility. One of the fundamental 
troubles of our economy in this country is that people find it very difficult to move” (Hansard, 
1980). 
Various studies in Europe and the US show that homeowners are less mobile than 
renters (e.g. Rossi, 1955; Boyle, 1993; Boheim and Taylor, 2002; Helderman et al., 2004; 
2006), but these studies often conflate private and public renting. Hughes and McCormick 
(1981, 1985, 1987) found for the UK that living in public housing, rather than home-
ownership, is the major tenure-related barrier to inter-regional mobility. Those resident in 
public housing were more likely to move residence over short distances than those in owner-
occupied housing, but much less likely to migrate over long distances and these results were 
confirmed in a number of later studies (Coleman and Salt, 1992; Boyle, 1995; 1997; 1998; 
Boyle et al., 1998). This lack of long distance mobility among social renters likely reflects a 
range of factors. First, social renters may be more likely to work in jobs that are only 
advertised locally, rather than nationally (Saunders 1985). Second, they have fewer resources 
to allow a move into private renting or owner occupied housing elsewhere. Third, the 
administrative controls imposed upon the distribution of public housing make it difficult for 
tenants to move between local authorities. Public housing policies were designed to house 
those most in need of public housing, but they prioritised the needs of those from within their 
own jurisdictions above the needs of those from other local authority areas. These policies 
therefore enabled high levels of short distance migration between council houses within their 
areas, as people’s circumstances altered, but tended to restrict (long distance) migration 
between areas (Boyle, 1995). 
Thatcher’s government was particularly concerned about the lack of job related 
migration among those in public housing. Neoclassical labour market theory identifies 
migration as an important instrument for individual career advancement (see Blau & Duncan, 
1967; van Ham, 2002; Mulder and van Ham, 2005), and this should have the effect of 
diminishing regional differences in wages and unemployment (Sjaastad, 1962). Any barriers 
to people’s ability to migrate can therefore harm both the economy and individual careers, 
making this issue a major policy concern (Boheim and Taylor, 2002; van Ham, 2002). Thus, 
Thatcher linked the inability to move to national economic performance: “Frequently 
investment goes where there are skilled people wanting work. But there must be some 
mobility. If today people aren't willing to move as their fathers did, the economy can't thrive” 
(Thatcher, 1980). 
It was imagined that freeing up the housing market by removing the debilitating effect 
of public housing policies would help to reduce constraints on mobility (Black and Stafford, 
1988). Despite this clearly stated goal of the RTB policy, there has been no research 
investigating whether social renters became more mobile after buying their house. This is the 
first study to examine rigorously whether the RTB legislation did indeed ‘free-up’ those in 
public housing who bought their homes. We examine whether there are differences in the 3 
 
mobility rates, distances moved, and reasons for moving between RTB-owners, social 





The large volume of houses sold under the RTB since 1980 has dramatically altered the UK 
housing market (Jones and Murie, 2006). The RTB initially gave only those living in council 
housing the right to buy their dwelling and was later extended to tenants of other social 
landlords, such as housing associations. Over the years, changes in policies and regional 
variations in the policies have incrementally introduced a high level of complexity into the 
RTB legislation (see Jones and Murie, 2006 for an excellent overview). Over the past 25 
years, there have been large fluctuations and regional differences in the number of sales, with 
peaks in 1982 and 1989. The RTB caused the distribution of dwellings by tenure to change 
radically: in 1981 57.6% of all dwellings were owner-occupied and by 2003 this had risen to 
72.3%. As a result of the RTB and changes in the provision of social housing in the UK, the 
share of local authority rented dwellings decreased from 29.2% to 13.0% and the share of 
housing association dwellings increased from 2.2% to 7.4%. 
The consequences of the RTB legislation have been studied intensively in the late 
1980s and the early 1990s, particularly in relation to the selective nature of sales. The RTB 
has tended to involve better-off tenants, the more desirable properties, in the more desirable 
areas. More specifically, during the early years of the RTB, the majority of tenant purchasers 
were middle- to old-aged married couples with non-dependent children (Forrest and Murie, 
1988). They also tended to be from higher social classes with white collar, skilled or semi-
skilled occupations (Williams et al., 1987), with at least one and often two earners in the 
household (Kerr, 1988; Lynn, 1991; Forrest and Murie, 1984a, 1984b; Jones and Murie, 
2006). Almost half of the buyers had been tenants for 20 years or more. Few of these initial 
RTB purchasers stated that they wished to move on in the near future and many expected to 
stay in their house for the rest of their lives (Forrest and Murie, 1984a; 1984b; Foulis, 1985). 
A survey by James et al. (1991) suggested that the RTB option was used by many tenants to 
secure their future in an area, rather than as a means of escape from ‘welfare’ housing or, 
indeed, as a means of enabling future mobility. It is now well recognized that a combination 
of factors has created an increased residualisation and stigmatization of the remaining council 
sector, has led to a shortage of social housing for relets in some regions, and has left a 
concentration of social housing in poor quality unpopular estates (Burrows, 1999; Forrest and 
Murie, 1988, 1990; Pawson and Bramley, 2000; Jones and Murie, 1999). 
Those suggesting that tenants who bought their dwelling under the RTB might be 
among the least mobile council tenants cast doubts over the supposition that the sale of 
council housing to existing tenants would increase working class mobility (Boyle, 1995; 
Diets and Haurin, 2003). Thus, it was entirely possible that the barriers to mobility caused by 
mechanisms to allocate social housing might simply be replaced by the barriers to mobility 
which arise from homeownership (see Forrest, 1987; Oswald, 1999; Nickell, 1998; Van 
Ommeren et al., 2000 on homeownership). Mobility of homeowners is strongly dependent on 
booms and busts in the housing market (Forrest and Murie, 1992) and regional house price 
differentials. Hamnett (1992) suggested that high prices in the South East were likely to be a 
more important factor overall in restricting labour mobility than council policies. Besides 
these general barriers to mobility, those who bought their house under the RTB might in 
addition find it difficult to find a buyer for their property. Although the dwellings sold under 
the RTB were among the best in the social sector, the quality of these dwellings and the 
neighbourhoods they are in is often poor compared to owner-occupied housing. 4 
 
Perhaps surprisingly, then, there has been no detailed research on the effect of the 
RTB on migration in the UK. Given that the legislation was first implemented around 30 
years ago and continues to today, although admittedly at a much reduced rate, it is an 
appropriate time to examine how migration rates have been influenced over the period and 
whether the policy did indeed encourage mobility as was anticipated. If the RTB indeed 
stimulated inter-regional mobility, we would expect those who bought their house as sitting 
tenants to be more mobile over long distances than those who remained in social housing. On 
the other hand, selective sorting into the RTB programme of tenants with the strongest desire 
to stay put, might cause those who bought their house to be the least mobile. In any case, we 
should expect low mobility in the first years after sitting tenants bought their house because 
anti-speculation penalties applied if households moved in the first 3 to 5 years. It is somewhat 
ironic that a policy partly designed to encourage mobility included a clause to discourage 
moves at the same time. We should also expect a drop in short distance mobility of those who 
bought under the RTB, compared to council tenants, because they now face the same barriers 
to mobility as traditional homeowners. We might also find regional differences in the effect 
of the RTB on migration as regional differences in the supply and cost of housing are known 
to have an effect on interregional migration (Dieleman, 2001). 
 
 
DATA AND METHODS 
 
We used data from the British Household Panel Survey (BHPS) which is a nationally 
representative sample of 5,500 households (10,300 interviewed individuals) drawn in 1991 
from 250 areas in Great Britain. Additional booster samples of 1,500 households for Scotland 
and Wales and 2,000 households for Northern Ireland were added to the main sample in 1999 
and 2001 respectively, resulting in a total sample size of around 10,000 households. In the 
BHPS the same individuals are re-interviewed each successive year on many topics. For each 
wave, information was available on actual moving behaviour, reasons for moving, the region 
in which people live, and individual and household characteristics. A potential problem when 
studying migration with panel data is that those who move are more likely to leave the panel 
compared to those who stay. Buck (2000) has shown that although this problem is present in 
the BHPS, its effect on the study of migration is limited because migrant attrition is relatively 
small. 
  We created a household-year file, rather than a person-year file, as we were interested 
in the movement of households, rather than the movement of single individuals. Households 
including one person were given the characteristics of the individual making up the 
household. For couple households the situation was more complicated. Because the 
household reference person in the BHPS is not constant over time (even if household 
composition does not change), and is biased towards males, a random person was selected 
from couples for the first year that they were in the BHPS, resulting in 101,206 household 
year records. We identified RTB-owners in two different ways. For the first wave (Wave A, 
1991) we used the question “At the time you bought this house/flat were you already living 
here as a tenant?” If yes and the vendor was a social landlord, such as a local authority or a 
housing association, we assumed that respondents had bought their house/flat under the RTB. 
For subsequent waves (Wave B to O, 1992 onwards) we identified RTB-owners by observing 
tenure change for non-movers. If tenure changed from social renter to homeowner without a 
move respondents were identified as sitting tenants who became RTB-owners. This exercise 
resulted in a total of 4,430 RTB-owner years, or 4.45 percent of all household years. 
The main dependent variable indicates whether a household has not moved, moved 
over short distance, or moved over long distance between two interview years. We defined 5 
 
long distance moves as moves over 35 kilometres. We also tried alternative specifications 
such as 40 and 50 kilometres, with little change to our modelling results. 35 Kilometres can 
be regarded as long distance because for most people this moves them out of their daily 
activity space (van Ham, 2002). We had a concern that moves caused by union dissolution 
would bias the outcomes of our models if the rate of union dissolution varied between 
tenures. This appeared to be the case in our data: RTB-owners were much less likely to split 
up than traditional owners or social renters. When separation/divorce occurred the household 
was removed from the sample so that moves resulting from separations were not counted. In 
the BHPS moves were recorded in 6.6% of the household-years (this is lower than average 
population mobility due to the removal of moves associated with separation/divorce).  
As expected, of all household years in the data, private renters (23.9% of household 
years with a recorded move) and ‘other’ renters (16.8%) moved most often, followed by 
social renters (7.2%). Traditional owners (5.1% of household-years) and RTB-owners (3.6%) 
moved the least. Only 14.6% of moves in the BHPS are over long distances. Social renters 
moved the least over long distance (6.4% of moves), followed by private renters (11.8%), 
RTB-owners (11.9%), traditional owners (18.7%) and ‘other’ renters (25.6%). We identified 
only 137 moves by RTB-owners in the BHPS data. 
We used panel logistic regression to model the probability of moving. We estimated 
two sets of models. In the first set the dependent variable indicated whether the household 
moved over short distance (1) versus did not move (0). In the second set of models the 
dependent variable indicated whether the household moved over long distance (1) versus did 
not move (0). We decided not to use a multinomial logistic regression model because 
theoretically the risks of moving over short or long distance are not competing risks. 
The independent variables in our mobility models were lagged by one year (i.e., we 
took the characteristics of the household in the year prior to the move because conceptually, 
pre-move characteristics should be better predictors of moving than post-move 
characteristics). The independent variables used were: age of oldest partner in the household; 
tenure; economic activity in five categories (single employed, single non-employed, couple 
both employed, couple non-employed, couple employed/non-employed); highest educational 
qualification in household; log of household income (corrected for inflation using ONS 
inflators); self-reported health based on daily activities among those in the household; room 
stress based on the number of rooms and the size of the household; age of the youngest child 
in the household. We also added three SAR-area level ecological variables to the BHPS 
dataset: median and mean house prices; percentage social renting; and working age 
unemployment rates. See Table 1 for summary statistics of the main variables. 
 
<<<TABLE 1 about here>>> 
 
There are a range of selection issues which might bias the outcomes of our models. We set 
out to use formal statistics to control for selection bias, but the number of RTB-owners in our 
data was very low, and there were too many selection mechanisms potentially relevant 
simultaneously (selection into social housing, into the RTB, out of the RTB), which were 
impossible to disentangle. We therefore focused on the most important selection issue, which 
is structural to the BHPS data: differences between respondents who were already RTB-
owners at the start of the panel (1991) and those who became RTB-owners during the panel. 
As indicated above, we used two ways to indentify RTB-owners in the BHPS. The 
problem with those identified in 1991 as RTB-owners (referred to as ‘pre 1991 RTB-owners’ 
in the rest of this paper) is that they are a selective sample of stayers: households who bought 
their house under the RTB and can still be observed in that dwelling in 1991. All those RTB-
purchasers who had since moved on to another dwelling before 1991 could no longer be 6 
 
identified as (former) RTB-owners (most are likely to have moved on to other owner- 
occupied dwellings and will be counted among the traditional owners). Thus, ‘stayers’ are 
over represented among ‘pre 1991 RTB-owners’ compared to those who became RTB-
owners during the panel (whom we could follow up, whether they moved or stayed). 
Including this relatively immobile group may have caused an underestimation of the mobility 
of RTB-owners. However, because we are dealing with a relatively low number of RTB-
owners in our sample, we were keen to retain them in the analysis and we therefore ran all 
our models for four different research populations: 1) all cases (66,622 household years); 2) 
all cases except pre-1989 RTB-owners (these are more likely to be a selection of stayers than 
1989-1991 RTB-owners who bought more recently before the panel started) (64,393 
household years); 3) all cases except ‘pre 1991 RTB-owners’ (for those who became RTB-
owners during the panel purchase year is known) (63,574 household years); 4) only 
households in social renting in 1991 some of whom became RTB-owners during the panel 
(purchase year is known) (15,178 household years). These different samples allow us to 
provide a more comprehensive assessment of the likely effects of the RTB on migration. In 
the models using research populations 1 and 2 we also included a dummy variable identifying 
‘pre-1991 RTB-owners’. We used this dummy variable to assess whether the ‘pre-1991 RTB-






To gain more insight into possible selection bias originating from selective entry into the 
RTB we first modelled the probability of becoming a RTB-owner. We found that higher 
income social renters were the most likely to become a RTB-owner (results not shown). 
Economic activity status also contributed to the probability of becoming a RTB-owner: dual 
earner couples were the most likely to become RTB-owners, followed by couples with one 
earner and employed singles, then followed by non-employed couples and non-employed 
singles. Those with a medium to higher level of education were more likely than those with a 
low level of education to become RTB-owners. Finally, poor health has a significant negative 
effect on the probability to become a RTB-owner. The results show that financially stable and 
healthy social renters were the most likely to buy their house under the Right to Buy. These 
findings are consistent with the existing literature. Because the selection mechanism into the 
RTB is likely not to be independent from the selection mechanism into long distance 
migration (income, economic activity, education and health all influence long distance 
migration as well) this might lead us to overestimate the effect of the RTB on long distance 
mobility. 
Table 2 presents the results from a series of panel logistic regression models of the 
probability to move over short distance (reference category are non-movers). As discussed 
above, we used four different research populations to gain insight into the extent to which the 
‘pre 1991 RTB-owners’ are a selected group of stayers. We also included a dummy variable 
identifying ‘pre 1991 RTB-owners’ in Models 1 and 2, but this variable was not significant. 
We also ran Models 1 and 2 without the ‘pre 1991 RTB dummy’ and although the parameter 
estimates of the main RTB dummy variable changed somewhat, the overall conclusions and 
significance levels stayed the same. 
The main variable of interest in Table 2 is tenure, with traditional owners as the 
reference category. In Models 1 to 3, social renters, private renters and other renters were 
significantly more likely to move over short distances than traditional owners. RTB-owners 
did not differ significantly from traditional owners. Further testing showed that RTB-owners 7 
 
were significantly different from social renters (p<0.01), providing some indication that once 
social renters become RTB-owners they behave more like traditional owners. In Model 4, we 
compared only RTB-owners and social renters; once again RTB-owners were significantly 
less likely to move over short distances than social renters. The results show that the tenure 
results were robust over Models 1 to 4, each based on a different sample. 
 
<<<TABLE 2 about here>>> 
 
Table 2 also contains a set of control variables and all the results are in line with what we 
expected based on the residential mobility literature. The probability of moving decreased 
with increasing age of the oldest household member (Models 1 to 4). With increasing 
household income the probability of moving decreased (Models 1 to 3). However, for social 
renters the probability of moving increased with income (Model 4), presumably because 
higher incomes provide social renters with more opportunities to improve their situation. 
Singles were more likely to move over short distances than couples, and couples consisting of 
two non-employed people were the least likely to move (Models 1 to 3). The probability of 
moving over short distances increased with level of education in all four models while the 
presence of children over the age of 5 had a negative effect on short distance moves (Models 
1 to 4). Room stress – defined as the number of rooms per person – had a negative effect on 
mobility. The more rooms per person, the less likely the household was to move. Having 
health problems had a positive effect on the probability of moving over short distance. Most 
of these moves will be associated with finding a dwelling that better fits the health situation 
of the household. Finally, households with one or more members from non-white ethnic 
minority groups were less likely to move than all white households, consistent with findings 
elsewhere (van Ham & Feijten, 2008; van Ham and Clark, 2009). 
Table 3 presents a set of four panel logistic regression models of the probability to 
move over long distance (reference category are non-movers). Again, results are presented 
for the four different research populations. Also in Table 3 the dummy variable identifying 
‘pre 1991 RTB-owners’ was not significant. The tenure variable shows that social renters 
were significantly less likely to move over long distances than traditional owners. The signs 
for the RTB-owner parameters were negative, but insignificant (Models 5 to 7). The findings 
indicate that also over long distance, RTB-owners behaved more similar to traditional owners 
than to social renters, although a more detailed test showed that the parameters of RTB-
owners and social renters were not significantly different. This indicates that over long 
distances, the moving behaviour of RTB-owners was in between the behaviours of traditional 
owners and social renters. In Model 8, only including social renters and during-panel-RTB-
owners, RTB-owners were also not found to be different from social renters in their long 
distance moving behaviour. The effects of the control variables in the models of long distance 
were similar in direction to those in the models of short distance mobility. The main 
differences were that non-employed singles were the least likely to move over long distance, 
and households with children under the age of 5 were less likely to move than other 
households (with and without children). In the long distance models, the effects of ethnicity 
and health were not significant. 
 
<<<TABLE 3 about here>>> 
 
We also ran models (results not shown) which took into account the fact that RTB-owners – 
who bought their dwellings with considerable discounts (up to 70%) – faced a penalty if they 
moved within 3-5 years (penalty periods differed over time and geographically) after buying 
their house as sitting tenants. We excluded all moves within the first few years after 8 
 
becoming a RTB-owner or after the last move (for other tenures) to make RTB-owners and 
others tenures more comparable. These models showed similar outcomes to those presented 
in Tables 2 and 3. 
We also looked at the regional differences in short and long distance mobility rates 
(results not shown). We followed two routes to investigate potential regional differences in 
mobility. First, we included interaction terms between region dummies (10 regions based on 
government office regions) and tenure dummies in the models. Second, we added regional 
characteristics to the household-year file using special licence Local Authority District 
(LAD) data. We hypothesised that in regions with high house prices, RTB-owners would be 
more likely to move over longer distances (to other regions where houses were relatively 
cheaper). We also hypothesised that in regions with high levels of unemployment RTB-
owners would be more likely to move over longer distances (to regions with better 
employment prospects). The models including interaction effects between region and tenure 
did not change the effects of tenure on short and long distance moves. Most of the region 
dummies were not significant and we found no specific effects for RTB-owners. Londoners 
were significantly less likely to move short distances than people resident in the reference 
category of ‘rest of South East’. Those from Wales, Scotland and Northern Ireland were the 
least likely to move over short distances. The least likely to move over long distances were 
those from the West Midlands, the North West and Tyne and Wear and the rest of the North 
East. To model the effects of regional characteristics on mobility behaviour we used 
multilevel models. House prices and unemployment levels had almost no effect on the tenure 
parameters. As expected, the higher house prices were in a region, the more likely people 
were to move out over a long distance (small effect). We found no specific effects for RTB-
owners. 
  Finally, we explored moving reasons by tenure. Table 4 shows that among movers, 
other renters were the most likely to move for employment reasons (35.2%), followed by 
private renters (12.3%), traditional owners (10.0%), RTB-owners (7.5%) and social renters 
(4.8%). RTB-owners once again fell between traditional owners and social renters. A Chi 
square test showed that the differences between the tenure groups are significant (p=0.000). 
Table 5 gives an overview of moving reasons based on another BHPS question with more 
categories. We recoded the original 35 moving reasons in the BHPS into fewer categories 
using the criteria of Boheim & Taylor (2002). Overall, ‘housing related issues’ were the most 
important reason for moving (almost 40% of moves) for all tenures, followed by 
‘neighbourhood related issues’ (13.7%). RTB-owners were more likely to move for 
neighbourhood related reasons (23.3%) than those in any other tenure, including social 
renters (18.7%). This is surprising, as we know that the uptake of the RTB was more 
common among those living in better properties in more popular neighbourhoods. RTB-
owners also gave health related reasons as an important reason for moves (12.8%), second 
only to social renters (16.4%). This could reflect the health status of those in social housing 
and/or the fact that RTB-owners were relatively old compared to those in other tenures. RTB-
owners were the least likely to move for housing-related issues (30.2%), probably reflecting 
that most of them bought their dwelling while they were reasonably satisfied with it. 
 
<<<TABLE 4 about here>>> 
 






This is the first study to use complex longitudinal data to examine rigorously whether the 
RTB legislation did indeed ‘free-up’ those in public housing who bought their homes. We 
used the BHPS in an innovative way to identify those who became RTB-owners during the 
panel. The number of RTB-owners found in the data was relatively small, thereby pushing 
the limits of what can be done with the data. The BHPS was nevertheless the best data 
available for this study as it uniquely allowed us to follow RTB-owners over time. 
Our results demonstrated that RTB-owners were about as likely to move over short 
distances as were traditional homeowners, but less likely than social renters. So after buying 
their house, RTB-owners showed more resemblance with the group they joined 
(homeowners) than the group they had departed (social renters). There are two opposing 
explanations for this finding: either RTB-owners are relatively satisfied with their dwelling, 
so there is no need for moving, or they are even more ‘trapped’ in their dwelling than they 
were before they bought it, because now they face the same moving restrictions as traditional 
homeowners. Homeowners are known to be less mobile than (social) renters over short 
distances because they live in better dwellings and because the costs associated with moving 
are much higher for owners than for renters. 
  Our results also demonstrate that RTB-owners are slightly more likely to move over 
long distances than social renters, and slightly less likely than traditional homeowners, 
although the differences were not significant. We have also shown that the uptake of the RTB 
was very selective, with mainly employed tenants with relatively high incomes and no health 
problems using the RTB. This suggests that RTB-owners have certain measured and 
unmeasured characteristics which would have made them more likely to move over long 
distance anyway. The combination of possible selection bias, and the lack of statistically 
significant differences, lead us to conclude that it is questionable whether the RTB had a 
causal effect on the mobility behaviour of RTB-owners. 
Despite large differences between regional housing markets in the UK, our study did 
not find any regional differences in the moving behaviour of RTB-owners. A possible cause 
is the relatively low number of RTB-owners and moves by RTB-owners in our dataset.  
Finally, our analyses of moving reasons showed that RTB-owners are less likely than 
traditional owners to move for job related reasons, but they are more likely to move for job 
related reasons than social renters. Again, they take a middle position between traditional 
owners and social renters. RTB-owners were found to be more likely to move for 
neighbourhood related reasons than those in any other tenure, including social renters. This is 
surprising since previous research has shown that RTB purchases tended to involve the best 
properties in the most favoured neighbourhoods. It might be the case that RTB-owners move 
to nicer neighbourhoods, possibly neighbourhoods with a higher share of owner-occupied 
dwellings, in order to confirm their new status as homeowners (compare Michelson, 1977). 
To gain more insight into the role of the neighbourhood in the moving behaviour of RTB-
owners, future research should look in more detail at housing satisfaction, moving desires and 
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 Table 1   Variable summary statistics (unit of analysis: household years) 





No move  94.9    
   Short distance moves (< 35km)  4.4    
   Long distance moves (>= 35km)  0.7    
Pre 1991 RTB dummy  3.6     
Tenure      
   Traditional Owner  66.8    
   Social Renter  22.0    
   RTB-owner  5.1    
   Private Renter  5.1    
   Renter 'other'  0.9    
Age (in years)    54.40 (16.33)  16 to 99 
HH income (log of income in pounds)    4.30 (0.36)  -0.20 to 5.91 
Household      
   Single-Employed  11.8    
   Single - Non-employed  24.3    
   Couple - Both Employed  32.2    
   Couple - Both Non-employed  15.9    
   Couple - Mixed  15.7    
Education      
   No & Low Qualification  50.3    
   Med Qualification (A Levels)  36.3    
   High Qualification (degree)  13.4    
Children      
   No children  70.3    
   Youngest aged 0-4  9.5    
   Youngest aged 5+  20.2    
Room stress (rooms/person) cut at 8    2.22 (1.22)  0.20 to 8 
Health      
   No limitations  72.9    
   Health limits daily activities  27.1    
Ethnicity      
   All HH members white ethnic  96.8    
   HH member of non-white origin  3.2    
Regional characteristics for Local Authorities    
% Social Renting    22.30 (8.90)  5.12 to 69.17 
% Unemployed (working age)    7.29 (3.09)  1.00 to 28.01 
Mean House Prices    83k (40,457.09)  33k to 411k 
Source: Author’s calculations using BHPS data for both short and long distance moves 




Table 2  Probability of short distance move (reference no move) using panel logistic 
regression for 4 different research populations 
  Model 1  Model 2  Model 3  Model 4 









  n=66,622 n=64,393 n=63,574 n=15,178 
 HHs=10,260  HHs=10,028  HHs=9,937  HHs=2,963 
  Coef.  Sig. Coef.  Sig. Coef.  Sig. Coef.  Sig. 
Fixed part           
Pre 1991 RTB dummy  0.276    0.369          
Tenure                
   Traditional owner (ref, models 1-3)             
   Social Renter (ref model 4)  0.406  ***  0.402 ***  0.400  ***     
   RTB-owner  -0.174    -0.171   -0.171    -0.515
  *** 
   Private Renter  1.557  ***  1.556 ***  1.556  ***     
   Renter 'other'  1.157  ***  1.172 ***  1.174  ***     
Age -0.114  ***  -0.115 ***  -0.116  ***  -0.094 *** 
Age square  0.001  ***  0.001 ***  0.001  ***  0.001 *** 
Household income  0.053    0.076   0.076    -0.372 *** 
Household              
   Single-Employed (ref)           
   Single - Non-employed  0.032    0.066   0.069    0.251 * 
   Couple - Both Employed  -0.222  ***  -0.203 ***  -0.200  ***  0.038  
   Couple - Both Non-employed  -0.345  ***  -0.345 ***  -0.358  ***  0.066  
   Couple - Mixed  -0.275  ***  -0.259 ***  -0.250  ***  -0.204  
Education              
   No & Low (ref)           
   Med Qualification (A Levels) 0.161  ***  0.161 ***  0.161  ***  0.265 *** 
   High Qualification (degree)  0.299  ***  0.297 ***  0.296  ***  0.271  
Children                
   No children (ref)           
   Youngest aged 0-4  0.008    0.003   0.006    0.000  
   Youngest aged 5+  -0.353  ***  -0.357 ***  -0.353  ***  -0.265 ** 
Room stress  -0.132  ***  -0.138 ***  -0.140  ***  -0.219 *** 
Health                
   No limitations (ref)           
   Health limits daily activities  0.196  ***  0.192 ***  0.196  ***  0.095  
Ethnicity                
   All white ethnic (ref)           
   One or more non-white HH members  -0.167    -0.152   -0.148    -0.356  
Constant 0.234    0.161   0.183    1.750 *** 
Random part    
 variance  0.35  0.35 0.36    0.31
 Intraclass correlation  9.6% 9.6% 9.8%    8.6%
Log likelihood  -10890.1 -10623.1 -10497.3  -2751.73
*=p<0.10;  **=p<0.05;  ***=p<0.01              
Source: Author’s calculations using data from the BHPS. 
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Table 3  Probability of long distance move (reference no move) using panel logistic 
    regression for 4 different research populations 
  Model 5  Model 6  Model 7  Model 8 









  n=64,199 n=62,023 n=61,229 n=14,512 
 HHs=10,221  HHs=9,990  HHs=9,899  HHs=2,896 
  Coef. Sig.  Coef. Sig.  Coef. Sig.  Coef. Sig. 
Fixed part           
Pre 1991 RTB dummy  -0.145   0.528          
Tenure             
   Traditional owner (ref, models 1-3)                 
   Social Renter (ref model 4)  -0.658 ***  -0.645 ***  -0.646  ***     
   RTB-owner  -0.161   -0.146   -0.148    0.618   
   Private Renter  0.985 ***  0.994 ***  0.994  ***     
   Renter 'other'  1.268 ***  1.283 ***  1.279  ***     
Age -0.120 ***  -0.120 ***  -0.122  ***  -0.155  ** 
Age square  0.001 ***  0.001 ***  0.001  ***  0.001   
Household income  0.301   0.336 *  0.325    0.786   
Household             
   Single-Employed (ref)                 
   Single - Non-employed  0.385 *  0.371 *  0.359  *  -0.323   
   Couple - Both Employed  -0.703 ***  -0.724 ***  -0.732  ***  -1.009   
   Couple - Both Non-employed  0.150   0.154   0.141    -0.704   
   Couple - Mixed  0.092   0.085   0.088    -0.134   
Education             
   No & Low (ref)                 
   Med Qualification (A Levels) 0.602 ***  0.611 ***  0.601  ***  0.197   
   High Qualification (degree)  1.283 ***  1.287 ***  1.289  ***  2.740  *** 
Children             
   No children (ref)                 
   Youngest aged 0-4  -0.394 **  -0.409 ***  -0.412  ***  0.356   
   Youngest aged 5+  -0.620 ***  -0.682 ***  -0.674  ***  -0.014   
Room stress  -0.129 ***  -0.134 ***  -0.133  ***  -0.117   
Health             
   No limitations (ref)                 
   Health limits daily activities  -0.181   -0.174   -0.183    0.316   
Ethnicity             
   All white ethnic (ref)                 
   HH member of non-white origin  -0.044   -0.033   -0.030    0.109   
Constant -3.128 ***  -3.252 ***  -3.161  ***  -6.865  * 
Random part    
 variance  1.56 1.53 1.54    5.43 
 Intraclass correlation  32.1% 31.7% 31.9%    62.3%
Log likelihood  -2656.06 -2613.62 -2583.14  -307.882 
*=p<0.10;  **=p<0.05;  ***=p<0.01             
Source: Author’s calculations using data from the BHPS. 15 
 
Table 4  Percentages of moves for employment reasons by tenure type at t-1 (row 
percentages) 
Tenure type  Yes  No  Count 
Traditional owner  10.01%  89.99%  1,948 
Social Renting  4.75%  95.25%  821 
Private Renting  12.25%  87.75%  751 
RTB-owner  7.45%  92.55%  94 
Renting 'other'  35.23%  64.77%  88 
Total  9.83%  90.17%  3,702 
Pearson Chi-Square: value=93.554, df=4, p=0.000 
Source: Author’s calculations using data from the BHPS 
 
 
Table 5  Moving reasons by tenure type at t-1 (row percentages) 









Traditional owner  6.20 10.48  0.53  6.90  1.93  42.51 4.92  13.26  11.71  1.55  1,870 
Social Renting  5.26 9.55  0.00  2.33  7.34  34.15 16.40 18.73  5.75 0.49  817 
Private Renting  6.33 7.57  2.06  3.85  14.17  41.95 3.71 8.94 9.22  2.20 727 
RTB-owner  4.65 12.79  0.00  3.49  2.33  30.23 12.79 23.26 10.47 0.00  86 
Renting 'other'  3.90 7.79  0.00  28.5  12.99  31.17 2.60 3.90 3.90  5.19  77 
Total  5.93 9.67  0.70  5.62  5.90  39.95 7.44  13.67 9.64  1.48  3,577 
Source: Authors’ calculations using data from the BHPS 